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Do Online Friends Bring Out the Best in Us? The Effect of Friend Contributions on Online Review Provision

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Abstract. User-generated online reviews are crucial for consumer decision making but suffer from underprovision, quality degradation, and imbalances across products. This research investigates whether *friend contributions cues*, in the form of highlighted reviews written by online friends, can motivate users to write more and higher-quality reviews. Noting the public-good nature of online reviews, we draw on theories of pure altruism and competitive altruism to understand the effects of friend-contribution cues on review provision. We test our hypotheses using data from Yelp and find positive effects of friend-contribution cues. Users are three times more likely to provide a review after a recent friend review than after a recent stranger review, and this effect cannot be solely explained by homophily. Furthermore, reviews written after a friend's review tend to be of higher quality, longer, and more novel. In addition, friend reviews tend to have a stronger effect on less-experienced users and less-reviewed products/services, suggesting friend-contribution cues can help mitigate the scarcity of contributions on *long-tail* products and from infrequent contributors. Our findings hold important implications for research and practice in the private provision of online reviews.

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1. Introduction

User-generated online reviews have become a dominant source of information for consumers. According to a 2018 report by BrightLocal, 85% of consumers said that their buying decisions were influenced by online reviews (BrightLocal 2018). Prior research consistently shows that increasing the volume of online reviews has a positive influence on product sales (Dellarocas et al. 2007, Duan et al. 2008, Forman et al. 2008). Therefore, it is of practical importance for vendors and online review platforms (ORPs) to attract many user-generated reviews.

In reality, however, online reviews are underprovisioned (Fortune 2016, Goes et al. 2016). Studies estimate that only 1% of consumers have ever written an online review (Yelp 2011, Anderson and Simester 2014). This is not entirely surprising because online reviews are privately provisioned public goods; consumers have strong incentives to free ride on the contributions of others, leading to underprovision. The contribution to online reviews is also highly imbalanced across products (Tucker and Zhang 2007, Dellarocas et al. 2010, Burtch et al. 2018). For example, only 2.2% of restaurants on Yelp receive more than 13 reviews per month, whereas more than 30% receive no review

(Luca 2016). Adding to these concerns is a rapid decline in quality: the average length of online reviews has decreased from 600 characters in 2010 to just over 200 characters in 2017 (Liu et al. 2007, Mudambi and Schuff 2010, ReviewTrackers 2018). To address these issues, ORPs have used several approaches, including offering coupons, discounts, and other financial incentives to motivate review contributions.¹ Recent research suggests that such tangible rewards are effective but often have downsides such as resulting in lower-quality reviews and eroding consumer trust (Stephen et al. 2012, Ghasemkhani et al. 2016, ReviewMeta.com 2016, Burtch et al. 2018).

Our research explores a new *friend-contribution cue* approach: that is, motivating review contributions by highlighting reviews written by one's online friends. The friend-contribution cue approach is applicable when ORPs support social networking among users.² Such ORPs can highlight the contributions of a user's online friends. For example, Yelp shows friend reviews on top of other reviews on business pages and users' homepages. Highlighting friend reviews may aid users in their discovery of new products and services, but its effects on users' contribution behavior are

unexplored. We ask the following questions in this research:

- Can friend-contribution cues motivate a user to contribute a new review?
- Can friend-contribution cues lead to higher quality reviews?

Readers familiar with the social influence literature may assume that friend contributions increase users' own contributions. Prior research has found that friends generate a positive social influence in private-goods domains such as the adoption of paid music and store check-ins (Bapna and Umyarov 2015, Liu et al. 2015, Zhang et al. 2015, Qiu et al. 2018). However, the public-goods nature of online reviews suggests a countervailing free-riding effect may exist: One user's contribution may substitute for another's, especially between online friends who are likely to hold similar opinions (Underwood and Findlay 2004, Lee et al. 2016). This free-riding effect has been noted in other public-goods contexts in the forms of social loafing, *volunteer's dilemma*, and *bystander* effects (Darley and Latané 1968, Diekmann 1985, Karau and Williams 1993). Because of free riding, it is unclear whether friend contributions lead to more or fewer reviews, especially considering that review writing is time-consuming and requires certain expertise. In addition, we do not yet know the effect of friend contributions on contribution quality or the distribution of reviews across products and users.

The friend-contribution cue approach, if proven effective, can complement existing research studying social influences in online review writing behavior. Our approach differs from an alternative social cue approach highlighting aggregate contributions (e.g., "3,786 users have recently contributed online reviews") (Burtch et al. 2018). Such aggregate-contribution cues fail to induce more reviews, although they may increase review lengths (Burtch et al. 2018). The friend-contribution cue operates very differently from the aggregate-contribution cue. The former uses specific contributions by online friends, whereas the latter uses aggregate contributions by anonymous peers. As a result, friend-contribution cues are more personally relevant and targeted. Notwithstanding these differences, the two forms of social cues can be used together. We further differentiate our study from research on how ratings of friends affect subsequent ratings. Wang et al. (2018) focus on whether one's friends' average ratings influences the focal users' ratings (provided that the focal users also provide ratings). It does not address a user's likelihood of offering a review or the quality of the review, as we do in our research.

We extend theories of public goods to understand the effects of friend-contribution cues on the quantity and quality of online review provision. One theory, called *pure altruism*, holds that users contribute

because they value the welfare of others; it implies that a friend's contribution would substitute for a focal user's contribution because of diminishing marginal benefits of an additional contribution to the public. Another theory, called *competitive altruism*, holds that users make altruistic contributions to gain status in a community; thus, a friend's contribution could stimulate further contribution by signaling a relevance of contribution and a favorable audience for such contributions. Building on these countervailing arguments, we develop hypotheses about the effects of friend-contribution cues on one's own contribution in terms of both quantity and quality.

We test our hypotheses using a unique data set of restaurant reviews from Yelp. Yelp provides extensive social networking features among users and highlights friends' reviews on business pages and users' homepages. In addition, Yelp lets users vote on each other's reviews and nominate outstanding users to become *elites*, who enjoy many perks such as free dinner parties and tasting events. We assemble a user-restaurant-week panel of review contributions from 2,923 users toward 8,289 restaurants in the state of Washington over a period of 36 weeks. Using this panel, we formulate a discrete hazard model of a user's likelihood of reviewing a restaurant in a given week as a function of the number of friend reviews for the restaurant in the preceding week. We use this model to examine the effect of friend-contribution cues and how it varies with restaurant and user characteristics. We also study the effect of friend-contribution cues on review quality, which we measure using the number of *votes* received by the review, independent quality ratings by Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (henceforth *Turker Ratings*), and a review *novelty score* based on the review's content.

One of the challenges in estimating the effect of friend-contribution cues is the potential confound of the homophily effect; that is, two friends write reviews on the same restaurant because they have similar preferences. We control for the homophily effect using a user's future friends: future friends have similar preferences as the user, but their reviews may not influence the user's contribution decisions. Therefore, the effect of future-friends' reviews, which is driven by homophily alone, can be used as a proxy for the homophily effect.

2. Related Literature

In the following, we discuss the relation of this research to two literature streams—provision of online reviews and voluntary provision of public goods—with a focus on the role of social influence in each case.

2.1. Provision of Online Reviews

The online review literature has approached the provision of online reviews from three perspectives: valence,

volume, and quality. A review's valence refers to the tone of the review as typically measured by the associated numeric rating. Research in this stream reveals that social factors including peer ratings (Sridhar and Srinivasan 2012, Ma et al. 2013, Lee et al. 2015) and friend ratings (Lee et al. 2015, Wang et al. 2018) may impact review valence. Lee et al. (2015) demonstrate that higher peer ratings induce users to also provide high ratings. Wang et al. (2018) study the effect of friend ratings on the valence of book reviews and find that users tend to give similar ratings as their friends. As a result, they suggest that ratings following after friends' ratings are more biased. Studies of review valence focus on whether a review leans positive or negative rather than on the likelihood of contribution and contribution quality.

Research on the volume of online reviews shows that characteristics of the product (Dellarocas et al. 2010), a user's consumption experience (Dellarocas and Narayan 2006), and reviewer characteristics (Moe and Schweidel 2012, Goes et al. 2014) can all affect the quantity (or likelihood) of review provision. Within this stream, a few studies examine how ORPs can increase the volume of online reviews using financial or social incentives. Burtch et al. (2018) show that financial incentives increase review volume but not length. Financial incentives often lead to undesirable side effects such as lower-quality reviews and eroding consumer trust (Stephen et al. 2012, Ghasemkhani et al. 2016, Burtch et al. 2018).

Burtch et al. (2018) and Chen et al. (2010) study the effect of social cues on the volume of reviews. Chen et al. (2010) demonstrate that, after being shown the median number of rating contributions, users below (above) the median increase (decrease) their contributions. Burtch et al. (2018) show that aggregate contribution cues increase review length but not volume. However, when combining financial incentives with aggregate-contribution cues, one could increase both review length and the volume of reviews. As noted in the introduction, the aggregate-and friend-contribution cues operate quite differently and thus may be used independently.

The literature on review quality concentrates on the association between textual features of reviews and the number of helpfulness votes it receives, an often-used proxy for review quality (Mudambi and Schuff 2010, Ghose and Ipeiroitis 2011, Yin et al. 2014). This stream also examines the relationship between contextual factors, including product type and reviewer characteristics, and review quality (Lu et al. 2010, Mudambi and Schuff 2010). It, however, does not focus on the issue of how to promote review quality, with the exception of Burtch et al. (2018), who examines the effects of financial incentives and aggregate-contribution cues on review length, a correlate of review quality.

2.2. Social Influence and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

Prior research finds evidence of social influence among friends in many private-goods domains, including adoption of paid music services and products (Bapna and Umyarov 2015, Zhang et al. 2015), music consumption (Dewan et al. 2017), store check-ins (Qiu et al. 2018), and peer-to-peer lending (Liu et al. 2015).³ As mentioned earlier, social influence in the private provision of public goods is different because of the free-riding tendency. In what follows, we focus on social influence in public-goods domains.

One stream of research investigates the effect of peer contributions in *electronic communities of practice*, such as online discussion forums, Q&A forums, and knowledge-sharing communities (Wasko and Faraj 2005, Wasko et al. 2009). Contributions to these forums have characteristics of public goods, but they tend to disproportionately benefit people involved in a conversation (e.g., information seekers). Because of the directed nature of such contributions, researchers have relied on reciprocity theories to explain the effect of peer contributions (Xia et al. 2011, Jabr et al. 2014). The reciprocity theories may not apply in online reviews because online reviews benefit a broad audience rather than specific individuals.

Perhaps more relevant to this research is the literature on charitable contributions, which are a form of private provision of public goods. This stream widely acknowledges that peer contributions can potentially crowd out one's own contributions. For example, Tsvetkova and Macy (2014) show that observing others' helping behavior decreases one's own helping. However, findings are mixed on whether there is a positive or negative relationship between the contributions of others and one's own contribution (Shang and Croson 2009). To account for the positive relationships, this literature offers several informal explanations, including conformity (Bernheim 1994), achieving social acclaim (Vesterlund 2006), gaining social approval, and peer contribution as a signal of a charity's quality (Vesterlund 2003). The charitable giving literature has not examined the role of (online) friend contributions. Furthermore, online reviews are distinct from charitable giving in at least two dimensions: online reviews may reflect one's intelligence and skills, and there are user communities for online reviews.

3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses

In this section, we develop the hypotheses for the effect of friend contribution cues (or *friend contributions* for short, provided that they are highlighted). Using restaurant reviews as an example, we examine how the addition of a friend review, *relative to that of a*

stranger review, affects a focal user's contribution in terms of probability of contribution and review quality. We will focus on friends' recent contributions because we expect a decay effect (that we later confirm): the chance of a user acting on a friend's review while it is fresh is much higher than when the friend review has been posted for a long time. We note that it is common for studies of online reviews to focus on recent stimuli (Duan et al. 2008, Dellarocas et al. 2010, Wang et al. 2018). We also limit ourselves to contributions to the same restaurant because we do not have a good way of attributing other-restaurant contributions to the focal friend reviews.

3.1. Effect of Friend Contributions on Review Quantity

To understand users' contribution behavior under the influence of friend contributions, we draw on theories of private provision of public goods. Although social influence theories such as social learning and normative social influence may seem relevant (Aral and Walker 2011, Iyengar et al. 2011), we choose theories of public goods as an overarching theoretical framework for two main reasons.⁴ First, social-influence theories are useful for explaining social contagion in the diffusion of products, services, and ideas, but they do not provide an explanation of why an individual contributes to public goods in the first place. Thus, they are incomplete for explaining contributions to public goods. Zeng and Wei (2013) made a similar observation when studying how social ties affect similarities of photos uploaded to Flickr. Second, most social influence theories do not address contribution quality, which is not an issue in adoption settings but is one of the important goals of this research.

We first draw upon a well-known theory of *pure altruism*, which suggests that individuals make altruistic contributions because they value not only their own welfare but that of others (Andreoni 1989, 1990). This theory is consistent with the idea that one of the main motivations for writing an online review is to help others make a better purchase decision (Dichter 1966, Hennig-Thurau et al. 2004). There is also neural evidence in support of pure altruism: peoples' neural activity in value/reward areas correlates with their rate of actual charitable donations (Harbaugh et al. 2007, Hubbard et al. 2016).

The theory of pure altruism leads to an important consequence for peer contributions (Tsvetkova and Macy 2014): As peers contribute more to public goods, an additional unit of contribution adds less value to the collective good and, therefore, an individual has less incentive to contribute. Such a *substitution effect* has been documented in contexts such as charitable contribution (Shang and Croson 2009, Witty et al. 2013, Tsvetkova and Macy 2014). The substitution effect can

be further amplified when the peer contribution is a friend contribution. This is because online friendships tend to form around shared interests and opinions (Dey 1997, Moretti 2011). When a user sees a friend review on a restaurant, compared with a stranger review, the user is more likely to consider writing her own review as redundant. Therefore, she is less likely to offer a review of the same restaurant. In sum, the pure altruism theory of public goods would suggest that a friend review, relative to the stranger review, would reduce a user's own contribution.

Another theory of public goods, called *competitive altruism*, holds that people contribute to public goods not because of their genuine concern for others but to gain status in a social group that rewards individuals based on their relative contribution and commitment to the group (Roberts 1998, Hardy and Van Vugt 2006, Willer 2009).⁵ Recognizing that individuals may lack the motivation to contribute to public goods, the group as a whole has the incentive to collectively reward people who make outstanding altruistic contributions (e.g., by granting such individuals prestige, trust, and preferential treatment in partner selection). One such example is the peer review of journal submissions: Academic communities use best-reviewer awards, recognition by journal editors, and promotion to editorial positions to motivate voluntary peer reviews. Competitive altruism holds that in a community that associates status rewards with outstanding altruistic behaviors, individuals would compete to make altruistic contributions in ways that suggest a high level of competence, generosity, and commitment (Hardy and Van Vugt 2006, Willer 2009). Existing research in online reviews lends support to the theory of competitive altruism: Survey studies consistently show that an important motivation for writing online reviews is the pursuit of attention, status, and superiority (Pan and Zhang 2011, Wang et al. 2019, Huang et al. 2017).

Compared with pure altruism, competitive altruism holds a very different implication for the effect of friend contributions. Research suggests that social contacts are especially helpful for gaining status (Anderson and Kilduff 2009). With a large social group, an individual's altruistic contributions can easily go unnoticed by random strangers. Online friends, on the other hand, are more likely to pay attention to a user's contribution and provide favorable appraisals because of their shared interests and personal connection with the focal user. Therefore, online friends would be more helpful for a user's pursuit of status. In addition, friend contributions can serve as a beacon for altruistic contributions: Existing friend contributions suggest that contributing a review of this restaurant is socially desirable and would enhance the user's commitment to her social group.

In contrast, existing stranger contributions do not offer such added benefits. Therefore, competitive altruism predicts a positive effect of friend contributions: A user is more likely to offer her review after observing a friend review, compared with a stranger review.

Despite the different predictions of pure and competitive altruism, they may not be mutually exclusive. A user motivated mainly by competitive altruism may still have concerns with being redundant after a friend's contribution; conversely, a user whose main goal is to help others may still value the status-building benefits of contributing after a friend. In our research context, however, we expect the effect of competitive altruism to dominate because of a strong user community and status system on Yelp. First, the platform and its users have invested strongly in community building. Second, as described earlier, Yelp has an elaborate community-driven status system. Each year, the community selects new elite users based on community votes and peer nominations. Last, Yelp and the user community provide enhanced status benefits. Elite users not only enjoy prestige within the community but also perks offered by store owners and/or the platform. Even earning a local status can have benefits. Even nonelite users can benefit from enhanced status: for example, they would have a higher chance of being invited to official events for all Yelp users and private gatherings. Therefore, we expect the prediction of competitive altruism will prevail, leading to a positive effect of friends' reviews.

Hypothesis 1. *Holding the total number of recent reviews constant, a user's likelihood to review a restaurant increases with the number of recent reviews posted by her friends on that restaurant.*

In addition, we explored two variables that might moderate our main hypothesis: store popularity (as measured by the number of existing reviews) and the user's reviewing experience. We argue that pure and competitive altruism can hold different implications for such moderating effects. Because of the exploratory nature of our arguments, however, we do not offer formal hypotheses.

From the perspective of pure altruism, when a restaurant has more existing reviews, each additional review adds less value. Although a friend review is a stronger substitute for the focal user's review than a stranger review, both have a diminishing effect as the restaurant has more existing reviews. Therefore, the additional (negative) substitution effect of a friend review also diminishes with more existing reviews, implying the effect of friend reviews to increase with the number of existing reviews. If the focal user has more experience in writing reviews, her contribution would be higher, and the substitution effect of a friend review would be weakened, suggesting an increase in the effect of friend reviews.

From the perspective of competitive altruism, when a restaurant has more reviews, contributing an additional review after a friend is less helpful for status building. This is because such a contribution is less distinctive and less helpful for the social group to distinguish itself (Levina and Arriaga 2014). Therefore, the positive effect of contributing after a friend contribution is reduced. A more experienced user, because of her higher status, is less eager to impress her friends. Therefore, we expect the positive effect of friend contributions to be weaker for more experienced users.

In sum, pure and competitive altruism lead to different predictions on moderating effects. Again, noting the strength of community and status system in our setting, we expect the predictions of competitive altruism to prevail, although acknowledging that the forces of pure and competitive altruism may coexist.

3.2. Effect of Friend Contributions on Review Quality

Pure altruism theory suggests that, after a friend's contribution, the marginal value of another contribution decreases. This leads to a lower effort by the focal user, which could result in a lower-quality review. On the other hand, competitive altruism suggests that individuals contribute reviews as a way of gaining status, and they will do so in ways that suggest a high level of competence and generosity (Anderson and Kilduff 2009). When a user offers a review after a friend, she knows her friends will pay close attention, so she will put in more effort to produce a high-quality review to impress her friends. In this way, friends can bring out the best in the user. Similar to Hypothesis 1, we expect that the prediction of competitive altruism will prevail in our context, leading to a positive effect of a friend contribution on subsequent contribution's quality, and such an effect would increase with the number of friend contributions.

Hypothesis 2. *Holding the total number of recent reviews constant, the quality of a user's review of a restaurant increases with the number of recent reviews posted by her friends on that restaurant.*

4. Research Context and Data

We collected our data from Yelp, one of the largest and most successful online review platforms in the world. Yelp operates as a platform for user-generated reviews for local businesses such as restaurants and schools. Only registered users can write reviews. Each registered user has a public profile that includes information such as the user's name, location, reviews written, friends, bookmarks, and compliments received (see the online appendix for details). Yelp has

extensive support for social networking. Users can also vote on existing reviews (no login required) written by others on three dimensions: useful, funny, and cool (Figure 1). Users can also follow other users and send compliments to them. A user can request to become friends with other users.⁶ Once the friend request is confirmed, users can receive updates on the friend's activities, such as the friend's reviews and photos, via the friends section of their private homepage (Figure 1(a)). Friend reviews will also appear on top of the review list on a business page (Figure 1(b)). Yelp does not send notifications of friend reviews to users.

To encourage contributions and community building, the Yelp Elite Council selects elite reviewers each year who are deemed stellar community members and role models. The selection is based on peer nominations and take into account the quantity and quality (votes) of one's contributions.⁷ Elite users are honored with a badge on their profile. Yelp elites enjoy many tangible benefits including invitations (with guest passes) to free Yelp Elite events and tasting events organized by businesses.

We collected data on restaurant reviews in the state of Washington between March 2013 and November 2013.⁸ To obtain a list of users in the Washington area who write restaurant reviews, we started with all 551 elite users located in Seattle, WA, and then obtained their friend lists, which resulted in 33,815 users. Among the 33,815 elite users' friends, we selected our study sample as those who were (1) located in

Washington (11,637), and (2) active (i.e., wrote at least one review on Washington restaurants) during our study period (3,630).⁹ The resulting set of 2,923 users accounts for 78% of all users who meet the two criteria,¹⁰ suggesting that we have a fairly comprehensive list of users.


For each user in our study sample, we revisited the user's profile and list of friends every month between March 2013 and April 2014. We also collected all their reviews, bookmarks, and compliments received since March 2012. To ensure that we had complete data on reviews, we separately collected a total of 109,402 reviews on all 8,289 WA restaurants generated during our study period.

5. Analysis on Review Quantity

5.1. Data Set, Model, and Variables

To test the effect of friend reviews on review quantity, we constructed a user $\times$ restaurant $\times$ period (week) panel in the following way. First, we intersected the 8,289 Washington restaurants with 2,923 users to obtain 24,228,747 user-restaurant pairs. Among all user-restaurant pairs, 18,387 user-restaurant pairs were *events* (i.e., the user wrote a review for the restaurant during our study period). Because events were rare in our data, we sampled all available events and a tiny fraction of nonevents and used weighting to correct the estimated coefficients (King and Zeng 2001). Specifically, we kept all events and randomly sampled five times the number of events,

Figure 1. (Color online) Examples of Friend Reviews on Yelp: (a) Friend Review Feeds on a Private Homepage and (b) Friend Review Featured on a Business Page



without replacement, from available nonevents (we also tested sampling three and seven times the number of events and obtained similar results). We then intersected the resulting 110,322 user-restaurant pairs with 36 periods to obtain 3,971,592 user-restaurant-period triples. Finally, we dropped cases where users had already written a review for the given restaurant and obtained 3,663,479 cases for our analysis.

Our dependent variable, $Review_{ijt}$, is a binary indicator of whether user i wrote a review on restaurant j in period t (i.e., whether user i survives in period t). Because a user can submit at most one review per restaurant,¹¹ and the panel consisted of discrete periods, we adopted a discrete-time survival model for our data, where an event is a review. The discrete-time survival model is equivalent to the logit model; the discrete-time hazard is the odds of dying (i.e., writing a review) conditional on survival up to that point.

Logit models are known to sharply underestimate event probabilities in samples with less than 200 events (King and Zeng 2001). To avoid such a bias, we adopted Rare Event logit (ReLogit) (King and Zeng, 2001, 2002) and used logit as a backup.

A potential confound of friend-contribution effects is homophily: A pair of friends independently chose to review the same restaurant because of their similar preferences. To control for homophily, we follow Wang et al. (2018) to include the number of reviews written by future friends as a control. Future friends share similar preferences with the focal user, but future-friend reviews would not have influenced the focal user. Any effect of a future-friend review is a result of homophily only. If the effect of a current-friend review exceeds that of a future-friend review, we can infer the influence of friend contribution beyond homophily.

Formally, we assume the utility for user i to write a review on restaurant j in period t , U_{ijt} , is a function of the numbers of reviews written by current friends ($CurFrndReviews_{i,j,t-1}$), future friends ($FutFrndReviews_{i,j,t-1}$), and anyone ($NewReviews_{j,t-1}$) on restaurant j in period $t-1$, additional control variables, and an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random component ε_{ijt} with a type I extreme value distribution.

$$U_{ijt} = \beta_1 CurFrndReviews_{i,j,t-1} + \beta_2 FutFrndReviews_{i,j,t-1} + \beta_3 NewReviews_{j,t-1} + \gamma Controls_{i,j,t-1} + \varepsilon_{ijt}.$$

(1)

We included an extensive list of control variables (see Table 1 for a description). We first controlled for several user characteristics. Following Wang (2010), we controlled for the number of compliments sent and received ($\#Compliments$) and the number of friends ($\#Friends$). We used the number of reviews by the user in the last period ($\#SelfReviews$) and the number

of cumulative reviews by the user up to the last period ($\#CumSelfReview$) to control for a user's tendency to write reviews. To control for the life cycle of users on the platform, we included tenure on the platform ($\#LogTenure$). We also controlled for a number of other user characteristics including elite status (*Elite*), gender (*Female*), and estimated income (*CityIncome*).¹² The estimated income was approximated by the median household income of the city where the user lives. We used the distance between users and restaurants to capture geographical proximity (*Dist*).

We controlled for a number of restaurant characteristics that may affect a user's review decision, including the restaurant's average rating ($AvgRatingRestaurant$), variance of existing ratings ($AvgVariRestaurant$), and cumulative reviews ($\#CumReviews$) because prior research suggested that these affect the quantity of new reviews (Moe and Schweidel 2012). We also included price range (*Price*) coded from levels 1 through 4 based on Yelp reported price ranges (\$ to \$\$\$\$), whether the restaurant page has been claimed by its owner (a claimed store more likely listens to online reviews, which may encourage users to submit reviews) (*Claimed*), restaurant categories (16 latent category dummies), and whether the restaurant was promoted by Yelp (*Promoted*). The variable *Promoted* indicates whether the restaurant was featured in the Yelp weekly email to users in period $t-1$. This variable allows us to control for marketing campaign effects. We coded restaurant categories by feeding documents of raw restaurant categories, one per restaurant, into a latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) algorithm to recover the underlying latent categories (16 of them) and the mapping of restaurants into latent categories (see the online appendix for details). Finally, to control for temporal shocks to review quantity, we included month dummies. Table 1 provides summary statistics of the data set.

5.2. Main Results on Review Quantity

Prior to estimating the models, we conducted collinearity tests and found no signs of collinearity ($VIF < 3$). We estimated three models, starting with only control variables, then adding current friends' reviews and new reviews in the last period, and finally adding future-friends' reviews. We ran both ReLogit and logit models with weighting adjustments. The results are shown in Table 2. Because the results are consistent across models, we omit Logit-1 and Logit-2 for brevity and report the results of ReLogit-3.

CurFrndReviews has a positive effect (odds ratio (OR) = 2.95, $p < 0.001$). *FutFrndReviews* also has a positive effect (OR = 1.87, $p < 0.001$) but smaller than that of *CurFrndReviews*. An *F*-test comparing the odds ratios for *CurFrndReviews* and *FutFrndReviews*

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables ($N = 3,663,479$)

Variables	Definition	Mean	Standard deviation	Min	Max
$Review_{ijt}$	Whether user i writes a review on restaurant j in period t : yes 1; otherwise 0	0.01	0.07	0.00	1.00
$CurFrndReviews_{i,j,t-1}$	No. current-friend reviews of user i on restaurant j in period $t - 1$	0.00	0.03	0.00	5.00
$FutFrndReviews_{i,j,t-1}$	No. future-friend reviews of user i on restaurant j in period $t - 1$	0.00	0.02	0.00	5.00
$NewReviews_{j,t-1}$	No. new reviews on restaurant j in period $t - 1$	0.42	1.06	0.00	38.00
$Log\#Compliments_{i,t-1}$	Log no. of compliments sent and received by user i in period $t - 1$	0.11	0.43	0.00	5.38
$\#SelfReviews_{i,t-1}$	No. of reviews written by user i in period $t - 1$	0.21	0.90	0.00	42.00
$Log\#CumSelfReview_{i,t-1}$	Log no. cumulative reviews by user i up to period $t - 1$	3.99	1.35	0.00	7.37
$LogTenure_{i,t-1}$	Log days elapsed since user i registered on Yelp up to period $t - 1$	7.09	0.52	3.85	8.03
$Log\#Friends_{i,t-1}$	Log (1 + no. friends of user i in period $t - 1$)	3.52	1.08	1.10	7.00
$Elite_i$	Whether user i is an elite user	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00
$Female_i$	Whether user i is female	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00
$CityIncome_i$	Median household income (thousands of dollars) of the city user i lives	69.37	13.72	24.49	192.25
$Dist_{i,j}$	Miles between restaurant j and the city where user i lives	50.35	66.57	0.00	439.94
$AvgRatingRestaurant_{j,t-1}$	Cumulative average rating of restaurant j up to period $t - 1$	3.59	0.69	0.50	5.00
$AvgVariRestaurant_{j,t-1}$	Variance of cumulative ratings of restaurant j up to period $t - 1$	1.07	0.30	0.00	2.00
$Log\#CumReviews_{j,t-1}$	Log no. cumulative reviews of restaurant j up to period $t - 1$	3.42	1.24	0.00	7.85
$Promoted_{j,t-1}$	Whether restaurant j is promoted in period $t - 1$	0.00	0.02	0.00	1.00
$Claimed_{j,t-1}$	Whether restaurant j 's business page on Yelp is claimed in period $t - 1$	0.66	0.47	0.00	1.00
$Price_j$	Price range of restaurant j : 1, least expensive; 4, most expensive	1.62	0.56	1.00	4.00

Note. We omit the summary statistics of 8-month dummies and 16 restaurant-category dummies for brevity.

is significant ($F = 7.81$, $p = 0.005$), indicating the existence of friend effects beyond homophily. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported.

Compared with current friend's reviews, *NewReviews*, which captures the effect of stranger reviews, has a much smaller effect ($OR = 1.10$, $p < 0.001$). The effect of *CurFrndReviews* ($OR = 2.95$) is comparable to that of reviews promoted in Yelp's weekly newsletters ($OR = 2.73$), suggesting a strong effect of friend reviews. We further computed the predicted probabilities of focal users writing a review when *CurFrndReviews* equals 0 (i.e., no friend review) and 1 (i.e., one friend review), holding all other predictors at their means. We find that the probability of writing a review is *three times higher* when there is a friend review compared with no friend review (0.0000225/0.00000765).

The effects of most control variables are in the expected directions. *Log#Compliments* has a positive effect, suggesting that socially active users are more likely to provide reviews. Both *#SelfReviews* and *Log#CumSelfReview* have a positive impact, demonstrating that productive users tend to write more reviews. As expected, *Elite* and *CityIncome* have a positive effect,

whereas *LogTenure* and *Dist* have a negative effect. *Log#Friends* has a negative impact, suggesting that having more friends, while fixing the number of friend reviews on the restaurant, is negatively associated with the user's probability of reviewing the restaurant. This finding is consistent with conformity: When a user observes that a larger proportion of friends do not contribute, she is more likely to conform to the norm of not contributing (Carpenter 2004). Consistent with Moe and Schweidel (2012), *AvgRatingRestaurant* and *Log#CumReviews* both have a positive impact, demonstrating that users tend to review highly rated and often-reviewed restaurants. *AvgVariRestaurant* has a negative effect, suggesting that users are less likely to review the restaurants if prior users have very different opinions. This is consistent with prior findings that consumers avoid visiting restaurants with high uncertainty in quality (Wu et al. 2015). *Promoted*, *Claimed*, and *Price* all have a positive impact.

In the last two columns of Table 2, we further show that the effect of friend reviews decreases with store popularity (measured by log number of existing reviews, *Log#CumReview*) (a plot of this effect is

Table 2. Effect of Friend Contributions on Review Quantity: Discrete-Time Hazard Models

Independent variables	ReLogit-1	ReLogit-2	ReLogit-3	Logit-3	Restaurant Popularity	User Experience
$CurFrndReviews_{i,j,t-1}$		2.949*** (0.240)	2.950*** (0.238)	2.943*** (0.238)	20.338*** (8.283)	9.122*** (3.790)
$NewReviews_{j,t-1}$		1.095*** (0.004)	1.095*** (0.004)	1.095*** (0.004)	1.094*** (0.004)	1.095*** (0.004)
$CurFrndReviews_{i,j,t-1} * Log\#CumReviews_{j,t-1}$					0.667*** (0.053)	
$CurFrndReviews_{i,j,t-1} * Log\#CumSelfReview_{j,t-1}$						0.814** −0.063
$FutFrndReviews_{i,j,t-1}$			1.870*** (0.267)	1.843*** (0.263)	1.861*** (0.265)	1.831*** (0.262)
$Log\#Compliments_{i,t-1}$	1.355*** (0.016)	1.344*** (0.016)	1.341*** (0.016)	1.341*** (0.016)	1.338*** (0.016)	1.342*** (0.016)
$\#SelfReviews_{i,t-1}$	1.120*** (0.004)	1.121*** (0.004)	1.120*** (0.004)	1.120*** (0.004)	1.120*** (0.004)	1.120*** (0.004)
$Log\#CumSelfReview_{i,t-1}$	1.456*** (0.015)	1.451*** (0.015)	1.451*** (0.015)	1.451*** (0.015)	1.451*** (0.015)	1.454*** (0.015)
$LogTenure_{i,t-1}$	0.722*** (0.011)	0.718*** (0.011)	0.718*** (0.011)	0.718*** (0.011)	0.718*** (0.011)	0.718*** (0.011)
$Log\#Friends_{i,t-1}$	0.912*** (0.008)	0.913*** (0.008)	0.913*** (0.008)	0.913*** (0.008)	0.914*** (0.008)	0.912*** (0.008)
$Elite_i$	2.001*** (0.039)	1.989*** (0.039)	1.989*** (0.039)	1.989*** (0.039)	1.990*** (0.039)	1.986*** (0.039)
$Female_i$	0.980 (0.015)	0.972+ (0.015)	0.972+ (0.015)	0.972+ (0.015)	0.973+ (0.015)	0.972+ (0.015)
$CityIncome_i$	1.001+ (0.001)	1.001* (0.001)	1.001* (0.001)	1.001* (0.001)	1.001* (0.001)	1.001* (0.001)
$Dist_{i,j}$	0.983*** (0.001)	0.982*** (0.001)	0.982*** (0.001)	0.982*** (0.001)	0.982*** (0.001)	0.982*** (0.001)
$AvgRatingRestaurant_{j,t-1}$	1.216*** (0.022)	1.197*** (0.021)	1.197*** (0.021)	1.197*** (0.021)	1.196*** (0.021)	1.196*** (0.021)
$AvgVariRestaurant_{j,t-1}$	0.631*** (0.025)	0.702*** (0.028)	0.703*** (0.028)	0.703*** (0.028)	0.698*** (0.028)	0.704*** (0.028)
$Log\#CumReviews_{j,t-1}$	1.731*** (0.014)	1.584*** (0.014)	1.583*** (0.014)	1.583*** (0.014)	1.594*** (0.014)	1.582*** (0.014)
$Promoted_{j,t-1}$	2.913*** (0.434)	2.725*** (0.407)	2.727*** (0.407)	2.700*** (0.403)	2.693*** (0.402)	2.699*** (0.403)
$Claimed_{j,t-1}$	1.110*** (0.021)	1.119*** (0.021)	1.120*** (0.021)	1.120*** (0.021)	1.119*** (0.021)	1.120*** (0.021)
$Price_j$	1.251*** (0.018)	1.266*** (0.018)	1.266*** (0.018)	1.266*** (0.018)	1.263*** (0.018)	1.266*** (0.018)
Constant	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Month and restaurant category dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
Log-likelihood	−200,055	−199,524	−199,514	−199,514	−199,476	−199,509
Pseudo- R^2	0.075	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077
N	3,663,479	3,663,479	3,663,479	3,663,479	3,663,479	3,663,479

Notes. DV, whether user i reviews restaurant j in period t ($Review_{ijt}$). The values are odds ratios (standard errors).
+ $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

available in the online appendix) and the focal user’s reviewing experience (measured by log number of past reviews, $Log\#CumSelfReview$), suggesting the friend-contribution cue approach has a strong effect for long-tail restaurants and less-experienced users. We report several robustness tests in the online appendix,

including (a) three ways of validating that future-friends’ reviews are a good proxy for homophily, (b) evidence that observed effects cannot be explained by awareness effects alone or by friends going to restaurants together, and (c) consistent results when including older friend reviews and inactive users.

6. Analysis on Review Quality

6.1. Effect of Friend Contributions on Votes

Review quality reflects a consumer's evaluation of how useful a particular review is in assisting a purchase decision. We used several different measures of review quality. The literature on review quality has predominantly used helpfulness votes received by a review as a proxy for review quality (Otterbacher 2009, Wang et al. 2019, Burtch et al. 2018). Following the literature, we first used votes to measure review quality. Yelp has three kinds of votes: *useful*, *funny*, and *cool*. We constructed two vote-based measures of the review quality: combined votes (*LogCombinedVotes*) and useful votes only (*LogUsefulVotes*).

We constructed a user-restaurant panel consisting of users who have offered a review for the restaurants. We used *CurFrndReviews* and *NewReviews* as independent variables and added *ReviewAge* to control for the effect that older reviews have more time to get votes.¹³ We also included many restaurant attributes and dynamic user attributes as controls. We estimated a panel-ordinary least squares (OLS) model with user fixed effects.

We first estimated a model with only control variables and then added *CurFrndReviews* and *NewReviews*. Our fixed-effect panel-OLS results are reported in Table 3 (M1–M4). As shown in M2 and M4, the coefficients for *CurFrndReviews* are positive and significant,

Table 3. Effect of Friend Contributions on Review Quality: Fixed-Effect OLS

Independent variables	DV = Log combined votes received (<i>LogCombinedVotes</i>)		DV = Log useful votes received (<i>LogUsefulVotes</i>)		DV = novelty (<i>Novelty</i>)	
	M1	M2	M3	M 4	M5	M6
<i>CurFrndReviews</i> _{<i>i,j,t-1</i>}	—	0.1084* (0.0484)	—	0.0928* (0.0388)	—	0.000795** (0.000293)
<i>NewReviews</i> _{<i>j,t-1</i>}	—	0.0080* (0.0034)	—	0.0063* (0.0027)	—	−0.000137*** (0.000036)
<i>ReviewAge</i> _{<i>i,j,t</i>}	−0.0005 (0.0008)	−0.0006 (0.0008)	−0.0004 (0.0007)	−0.0004 (0.0007)	—	—
<i>Log#Compliments</i> _{<i>i,t-1</i>}	0.0432** (0.0159)	0.0428** (0.0159)	0.0334** (0.0128)	0.0331** (0.0128)	0.000005 (0.000119)	0.000001 (0.000120)
<i>#SelfReviews</i> _{<i>i,t-1</i>}	0.0063+ (0.0033)	0.0062+ (0.0033)	0.0030 (0.0023)	0.0029 (0.0023)	0.000048** (0.000018)	0.000048** (0.000018)
<i>Log#CumSelfReview</i> _{<i>i,t-1</i>}	0.0641 (0.0579)	0.0627 (0.0577)	0.0379 (0.0490)	0.0367 (0.0489)	0.000459 (0.000499)	0.000445 (0.000502)
<i>LogTenure</i> _{<i>i,t-1</i>}	−0.2188 (0.1910)	−0.2206 (0.1919)	−0.1034 (0.1545)	−0.1049 (0.1552)	−0.002102* (0.000963)	−0.002094* (0.000961)
<i>Log#Friends</i> _{<i>i,t-1</i>}	0.1648* (0.0649)	0.1682** (0.0652)	0.1149* (0.0559)	0.1177* (0.0561)	−0.000246 (0.000407)	−0.000262 (0.000413)
<i>AvgRatingRestaurant</i> _{<i>j,t-1</i>}	0.0411** (0.0130)	0.0413** (0.0130)	0.0186+ (0.0107)	0.0187+ (0.0107)	0.000144 (0.000102)	0.000150 (0.000102)
<i>AvgVariRestaurant</i> _{<i>j,t-1</i>}	−0.0269 (0.0342)	−0.0186 (0.0342)	−0.0063 (0.0279)	0.0004 (0.0280)	0.000849*** (0.000199)	0.000738*** (0.000198)
<i>Log#CumReviews</i> _{<i>j,t-1</i>}	−0.0384*** (0.0059)	−0.0440*** (0.0063)	−0.0404*** (0.0046)	−0.0448*** (0.0050)	−0.001287*** (0.000058)	−0.001192*** (0.000060)
<i>Promoted</i> _{<i>j,t-1</i>}	0.1912+ (0.1065)	0.1767+ (0.1048)	0.1293 (0.0827)	0.1177 (0.0817)	−0.002082 (0.002265)	−0.001887 (0.002270)
<i>Claimed</i> _{<i>j,t-1</i>}	0.0159 (0.0150)	0.0165 (0.0150)	0.0212+ (0.0123)	0.0216+ (0.0123)	0.000021 (0.000148)	0.000014 (0.000148)
<i>Price</i> _{<i>j</i>}	0.0929*** (0.0136)	0.0926*** (0.0136)	0.0856*** (0.0111)	0.0854*** (0.0111)	0.001473*** (0.000132)	0.001475*** (0.000132)
Constant	1.4481 (1.2647)	1.4597 (1.2691)	0.7563 (1.0176)	0.7660 (1.0218)	1.009533*** (0.006392)	1.009450*** (0.006369)
Month and restaurant-category dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
Log-likelihood	−17,884.75	−17,874.85	−13,925.06	−13,914.88	67,347.28	67,363.72
Adjusted R ²	0.459	0.460	0.396	0.397	0.126	0.128
N	18,387	18,387	18,387	18,387	18,340	18,340

Notes. The values are coefficients (standard errors). The sample size for the last two columns was smaller because we cannot compute novelty scores for the first review.

+*p* < 0.10; **p* < 0.05; ***p* < 0.01; ****p* < 0.001.

suggesting that friend reviews have a positive effect on the quality of review contributed by the focal user, supporting Hypothesis 2.

6.2. Effect of Friend Contributions on Turker Ratings of Review Quality

Because votes can be biased by extraneous factors unrelated to review quality, such as the order in which reviews are displayed or the social relations between voters and the reviewer, we implemented an alternative measure of review quality by asking Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, or *Turkers*, to rate the quality of reviews on a five-point scale (1 = low quality, 5 = high quality). Instead of rating all reviews, which is costly, we selected carefully matched pairs of reviews. Specifically, we identified all users who have written two reviews: one preceded by exactly one friend review in period $t - 1$, no stranger review in period $t - 1$, and no friend review in prior periods (*AfterFrndReview* = 1); one preceded by exactly one stranger review in period $t - 1$, no friend review in period $t - 1$, and no friend review in prior periods (*AfterFrndReview* = 0). This design resulted in 52 users and 104 reviews. We obtained four Turker ratings per review (see the online appendix for details). We ran an OLS model with user fixed effects to control for user-specific effects on review quality. Our results, reported in Table 4, show that the coefficient of *AfterFrndReview* is positive and significant, suggesting that exposure to a friend review resulted in a higher-quality review than exposure to a stranger review. This lends further support for Hypothesis 2.

6.3. Effect of Friend Contributions on Review Novelty

If a review's content overlaps significantly with existing reviews, the review does not provide additional information for consumers and is judged to be of lower quality. To capture this dimension of review quality, we calculated a *novelty score*, based on the cosine distance between the latent-semantic-analysis-based representations of the focal and prior reviews of the same

restaurant (see the online appendix for details). We replicated our analysis on votes with novelty score as the dependent variable. Our results (Table 3, M5 and M6) show that *CurFrndReviews* has a positive effect on review novelty, lending further support to Hypothesis 2. In the online appendix, we further show that our results hold if we use review length as the dependent variable or include older friend reviews.

7. Discussion and Implications

Motivated by underprovision, quality degradation, and imbalances of online reviews, we investigate whether an online review platform can use friend-contribution cues to motivate users to write more and higher-quality reviews. We find friend contributions to have a positive effect on users' tendency to contribute and the quality of the resulting reviews. Users are three times more likely to provide a review after a friend has written one on the same restaurant, and this effect cannot be solely explained by homophily or awareness. Interestingly, friend reviews have a stronger effect on less-reviewed stores and less-experienced users. Reviews written after a friend's review are of higher quality, longer, and more novel.

7.1. Contributions to the Literature

This research makes two main contributions. First, building on theories of public goods, we developed a novel theoretical understanding of users' contribution behaviors under friend influence on online user communities as Yelp. Pure altruism holds that contributions are motivated by concerns of others' welfare, whereas competitive altruism holds that the pursuit of status can motivate altruistic contributions. We extended these theoretical perspectives to study the effect of friend-contribution cues and obtained a few distinct predictions that were supported by our empirical findings. These include (1) users respond to friend-contribution cues by increasing their own contributions, despite the incentive to free-ride; (2) the effect of friend-contribution cues is stronger for less-reviewed restaurants and less-experienced users; and (3) friend-contribution cues lead to higher quality reviews. Overall, we found competitive altruism to be a useful theoretical lens for understanding the private provision of public goods in an online community such as Yelp. We believe such a theoretical perspective can offer new insights for other communities of user-generated content.

Second, we contribute to the literature of online reviews by identifying a friend-contribution cue approach to promoting more and higher-quality reviews. Our approach complements the existing approaches (Chen et al. 2010, Burtch et al. 2018) by allowing ORPs to leverage social relations among users. Users who are exposed to reviews written by

Table 4. Effect of Friend Contributions on Turker-Rated Review Quality: Fixed-Effect OLS

Independent variables	Coefficient (SE)
<i>AfterFrndReview</i>	0.346* (0.112)
Constant	3.240*** (0.079)
Log-likelihood	-617.33
Adjusted R^2	0.165
N	416

Note. DV, user i 's review quality on restaurant j (*Quality*).

* $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

their online friends are three times more likely to offer a review, and such a review tends to be longer, more novel, and generates more votes. Importantly, the friend-contribution cue approach is more effective for less-reviewed products/services and less-experienced users, suggesting its potential for mitigating imbalances in online reviews and motivating occasional contributors. These combined benefits address important gaps in existing approaches for motivating reviewer contributions.

7.2. Managerial Implications

Our findings suggest that, to increase quantity and quality of review production, vendors and platforms should leverage social networks among users by highlighting recent reviews contributed by their friends. Our analysis suggests that the effect of friend contributions is comparable to the promoted reviews in Yelp's weekly newsletters (Table 2). For the most effective results, vendors and platforms should target products/services that have few reviews and less-experienced users. Our results also suggest the value of promoting/facilitating competitive altruism in the volunteer reviewer community. This might include the following: (1) instituting a community-driven process for selecting outstanding contributors; (2) selecting the outstanding contributors based on altruistic contributions and commitment; and (3) offering complimentary community-based rewards for outstanding contributors (e.g., dinner parties, tasting events, and privilege within the community). One caveat when using friend reviews is the finding of Wang et al. (2018) that friend influence may increase biases in review ratings. Platforms should be aware of such a potential downside and take steps to mitigate it, such as by favoring independent reviews when aggregating ratings.

7.3. Limitations and Future Research

This study has several limitations. Although we have controlled for homophily and many other factors, we cannot completely rule out the possibility of unobserved events driving both friend contributions and focal users' contributions. Randomized field experiments can help alleviate such concerns. Second, we do not have data to further delineate the effects of friend contributions by stages of a user's journey. We present evidence that the observed effect cannot be explained by increased awareness alone, but further research is needed. Third, our reliance on a popular snowballing-sampling approach may introduce biases, despite the fact that our sample covers nearly 80% of target users. Fourth, we do not have data to measure whether the users actually read the friend reviews. We present evidence that users only act on the friend review written in the last period and not

before. However, we do not know if this noneffect of the friend reviews prior to the last period is because users read them but are not influenced by them or if they do not read them. Further research on this is needed. Fifth, though we believe competitive altruism provides the best holistic framework for explaining our findings, there could be alternative theoretical explanations. As we noted previously, competitive altruism intersects with other theoretical traditions that can be further differentiated in future research. Finally, with appropriate data, future research can extend this study by examining how friend-contribution cues affect contribution to other restaurants.

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Endnotes

¹For example, Epinions used a revenue-sharing strategy with reviewers to encourage review generation. Amazon once offered free products to top reviewers and allowed product owners to offer free or discounted products to reviewers in exchange for their reviews but discontinued this practice under criticism.

²Throughout the paper, we define a user as a registered member of an ORP because only registered members are allowed to make online friends and post reviews.

³In addition, the social network literature has many examples of friend performance positively affecting an individual's performance (e.g., in school and workplace settings) (Altermatt and Pomerantz 2005, Cook et al. 2007). Again, free riding does not typically arise in these settings and some of the underlying mechanisms such as observational learning (e.g., modeling high levels of participation in teacher-student interactions) and social support (e.g., receiving help and guidance on homework assignments) may not apply to our context.

⁴Social influence and theories of public goods do interact, especially in the case of competitive altruism theory. Later, when deriving implications of competitive altruism for the effect of friend contributions, we do invoke arguments similar to social influence theories: for example, we argue that friend contributions signal relevance (similar to the arguments of social learning) and social desirability of such contributions (similar to the arguments of normative social influence), although we place such arguments in the framework of competitive altruism.

⁵Although the term competitive altruism is relatively new, a few key elements of the theory (e.g., individual's care for status as a driving force for altruistic contribution) have been previously noted in the theory of conformity of Bernheim (1994) and use of reputation to solve the tragedy of the commons of Milinski et al. (2002). The

theory's predictions are also consistent with empirical findings that status competition can provide strong motivations for voluntary giving (Jones et al. 1997, Donath 2002) and contribution in online communities (Wasko and Faraj 2005, Levina and Arriaga 2014).

⁶ Such online friends are typically formed based on shared personal interests and use electronic connection and communication as a primary form of interaction with each other (Hiltz and Wellman 1997, Dennis et al. 1998, Ridings and Gefen 2006).

⁷ According to a Yelp blog article (<https://www.yelpblog.com/2012/01/what-makes-a-yelper-elite/>), Yelp does not have a published checklist for its Elite criteria. Unofficial sources suggest that elite users are selected based on their last year's review contributions (both quantity and quality) and their engagement with the community, as reflected by their activities such as sending compliments, casting votes, and answering questions. The Elite status is not permanent. A user must earn the Elite badge each year.

⁸ We picked the Washington area because the number of restaurants and the number of reviews per month in this area are close to the average among 21 metropolitan areas featured on the front page of Yelp (Wang 2010).

⁹ A robustness test including inactive users yields consistent results (see the online appendix). It is worth noting that, even in the current sample, there are cases where the focal user had not written any review before period t .

¹⁰ Over time, we collected all users who wrote a review on any of the 8,289 Washington restaurants in our data set or who are either friends or friends of friends of the 551 elite users. Among the resulting 1,197,043 users at the end of our data collection, a total of 3,748 users were located in Washington and had written at least one review on a Washington restaurant during our study period.

¹¹ Yelp allows users to update their reviews at a later time, but such update incidents are rare. We focus on initial reviews because we are interested in whether users decide to offer a review.

¹² We inferred gender from the users' reported first names using Behind the Name's database (<https://www.behindthename.com>) that lists 21,100+ names and their genders. There are 134 cases where the first names were not in the database or gender ambiguous. We asked two research assistants to independently code the 134 cases based on users' profile photographs. Among these, there were eight cases where profile photos did not provide any gender information (e.g., foods, pets). The intercoder reliability was 0.95. We also validated our automatically coded gender by randomly sampling 100 users and comparing them with manual coding based on profile photos. The accuracy of automatic coding was 98%, which we deemed as adequate.

¹³ Additionally, to ensure all reviews had enough time to gather votes, we collected the votes of all reviews two years after the most recent reviews in our data set were written.

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